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ABSTRACT: The lessons of counterinsurgency have deeper
implications for cyber conflict than previous research has identified.
Two decades of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan provide insights
into the cyber strategy of defending forward including treating major
cybersecurity and technology companies as host-nation partners
and focusing on winning the hearts and minds of global netizens.

E

xisting research has yielded significant insights into cyber
capabilities as effective means for irregular warfare, but little
research has been devoted to applying lessons from irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency to winning cyber conflict. This does not
mean there is a direct and deep equivalence, only that some of the mindset
and culture for successful counterinsurgency can be useful for cyber
warriors. For example, major cybersecurity and technology companies
are, in important ways, analogous to host nations in cyberspace with
unique capabilities the US military cannot replicate. Sometimes more
firepower and applying overmatch wins. Sometimes—especially when
civilians and civilian infrastructure cannot be separated away from battle,
as in counterinsurgency and cyber—these efforts can make the problem
worse. And sometimes there is no military path to victory. Ultimately, the
United States may have to choose between taking the fight to the enemy
and winning the support of America’s, and indeed the globe’s, netizens.
After nearly 20 years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US
military has learned hard lessons about fighting irregular warfare and
counterinsurgency, but the relevance of these lessons to cyber conflict
and competition have been overlooked. Though the details differ, current
US cyber strategy is rooted in thinking similar to that on conventional
fights in the land, sea, or air. “We must take this fight to the enemy, just
as we do in other aspects of conflict,” noted General Paul Nakasone,
the commander of US Cyber Command.1 The new DoD strategy for
winning in cyberspace and an associated US Cyber Command vision
emphasize the lethality of US offensive capabilities, taking action to
“defend forward” and “disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its
source.”2 The overall goals are to achieve “overmatch” and “achieve

1. Paul M. Nakasone, “A Cyber Force for Persistent Operations,” Joint Force Quarterly 92 (1st
Quarter 2019): 11, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1736950
/a-cyber-force-for-persistent-operations/.
2. United States Department of Defense (DoD), Summary: Department of Defense Cyber Strategy
(Washington, DC: DoD, September 2018), 1.
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and maintain superiority in the cyberspace domain.”3 “A good offense,”
summarized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark
Milley, “is critical and that is the best defense.”4
The sustained application of initiative, maneuver, and firepower
would not have seemed out of place to General Ulysses S. Grant. “The
art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as
soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can and as often as you can,
and keep moving on.”5 But Iraq and Afghanistan proved warfare is not
always as straightforward as Grant supposed. The dynamics of irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency can be a distorted mirror image of those
of the traditional battlefield.

Offensive Capabilities and Irregular Warfare

The Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as: “a violent
struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence
over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and
asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military
and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence,
and will.”6 For additional clarity, the Department further focuses
on threat actors who use irregular means “such as guerrilla warfare,
terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency.” 7
Cyber capabilities have long been framed as especially useful
as a means for such irregular warfare, a topic which featured heavily
in some of the earliest research, including that of Winn Schwartau,
Dorothy Denning, John Arquilla, and others. More recent research,
especially at institutions of higher military learning, have examined
issues like developing an “unconventional cyber warfare employment
methodology” and exploring ideas like “cloud-powered foreign internal
defense” and “counternetwork COIN.”8
The unique characteristics of cyber capabilities make them relatively
easy to fold into operations across the range of irregular warfare. The
most obvious examples might be cyberattacks intended to take down
Ukraine’s electrical grid, the disruption of US elections, and sabotage of

3. US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority: Command
Vision for US Cyber Command (Fort Meade, MD: USCYBERCOM, April 2018), 4–5.
4. Nomination—Milley: Hearing before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 116th
Cong. (July 11, 2019) (statement of General Mark A. Milley), https://www.armed-services.senate
.gov/hearings/19-07-11-nomination_--milley.
5. Eric Foner and Olivia Mahoney, A House Divided, America in the Age of Lincoln (New York: W.
W. Norton & Company, 2018), 113.
6. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint
Operating Concept, vers. 2.0 (Washington, DC: JCS, May 17, 2010), 9, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36
/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v2.pdf ?ver=2017-12-28-162021-510.
7. JCS, Irregular Warfare, 9.
8. Christopher R. Eidman and Gregory Scott Green, “Unconventional Cyber Warfare: Cyber
Opportunities in Unconventional Warfare” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 3;
and Patrick Michael Duggan, “Strategic Development of Special Warfare in Cyberspace,” Joint Force
Quarterly 79 (4th Quarter, 2015): 49–50, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/621123
/strategic-development-of-special-warfare-in-cyberspace/.
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the production of weapons of mass destruction.9 Other examples include
intelligence agencies orchestrating bank and cryptocurrency heists for
hundreds of millions of dollars, hacking a television station and blaming
Islamic State terrorists, or using state assets to attack private companies.10
Cyber capabilities are useful to state actors. “Nobody wants full-on
war. . . . It’s bad for business. Irregular warfare tactics give these states a
degree of plausible deniability and nominally push the responsibility of
escalation off of their shoulders.”11

Lessons for Cyber from Counterinsurgency

Unlike research on cyber as a tool for irregular warfare, far less
research has been devoted to understanding how irregular warfare
might inform cyber strategies. In 2011, Greg Rattray and I analyzed
how lessons from irregular warfare can apply to cyber, which was
subsequently addressed by another scholar.12 In 2012, we applied
findings from research on counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and
stability and recovery operations to cyber conflict.13 More recently,
practitioners summarized the major past trends in research utilizing
the Counterinsurgency Diamond Model (analyzing the population,
disruptors, controllers, and governance) and proposed several
strategies.14 Another recent piece examined the failure to apply lessons

9. Adrian Bonenberger, “Ukrainian Elder Statesman: How Russian Hybrid War Is Changing
the World Order,” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/ukrainian
-elder-statesman-how-russian-hybrid-war-is-changing-the-world-order/; Andy Greenberg, “How an
Entire Nation Became Russia’s Test Lab for Cyberwar,” Wired, June 20, 2017, https://www.wired
.com/story/russian-hackers-attack-ukraine/; Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “The Plot to Subvert
an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far,” New York Times, September 20, 2018, https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.
html; and Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon,”
Wired, November 3, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/.
10. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established
Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) (New York: UNSC, March 5, 2019), https://www.ncnk.org/sites
/default/files/UN_POE_March2019_Final_Report.pdf; Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Cyber
Operations Tracker, Compromise of TV5 Monde, (Washington, DC: CFR, April 2015), https://www.cfr
.org/cyber-operations/compromise-tv5-monde; Russell Brandom, “How a DDoS Campaign Became
an Act of Cyberwar,” Verge, March 24, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11301876
/ddos-iran-banks-dam-prosecution-indictment; and Peter Elkind, “Sony Pictures: Inside the Hack
of the Century,” Fortune, June 25, 2015, https://fortune.com/longform/sony-hack-part-1/.
11. John Costello, “China’s Irregular Warfare in the Cyber Domain,” Real Clear Defense, June
17, 2015, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/06/18/chinas_irregular_warfare_in
_the_cyber_domain_108094.html.
12. Gregory J. Rattray and Jason Healey, “Non-State Actors and Cyber Conflict,” in America’s
Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, 2011), 65–86; and Ben Whitham, “Exterminating the Cyber Flea: Irregular
Warfare Lessons for Cyber Defence,” in Proceedings of the 13th Australian Information Warfare and Security
Conference (Perth, Western Australia: Security Research Institute, Edith Cowan University, 2012).
13. Gregory J. Rattray and Jason Healey, “Non-State Actors in Cyber Conflict,” in Addressing
Cyber Instability, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Gregory J. Rattray (Vienna, VA: Cyber Conflict Studies
Association [CCSA], 2012).
14. Frank C. Sanchez, Weilun Lin, and Kent Korunka, “Applying Irregular Warfare Principles
to Cyber Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 92 (1st Quarter 2019): 15–22, https://ndupress.ndu.edu
/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-92/jfq-92_15-22_Sanchez-Lin-Korunka.pdf.
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from counterterrorism efforts to cyber conflict.15 David Raymond
addresses the paradoxes of counterinsurgency as this article does, but he
focuses on tactical and technical aspects, gleaning lessons for offensive
and defensive military cyber operators.16
That counterinsurgency may hold central lessons to deal with cyber
conflict is suggested by a single sentence from John Nagl’s forward to
the original Army and Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency,
“while firepower is the determinant of success in conventional warfare,
the key to victory in counterinsurgency is intelligence on the location and
identity of the insurgent enemy derived from a supportive population.”17
This sentence hits on the three similarities of counterinsurgency strategy
to cyber conflict: adversaries are hidden and depend on deception; the
conflict is fought in and among the populace (and with a host nation);
and the relationship between superior firepower and long-term success
is not as straightforward as it is in the modern system of warfare.

Deception and the Role of Intelligence
In both counterinsurgency and cyber conflict, adversaries try to
remain hidden and rely extensively on deception for success. Surprise
attacks and ambushes are the norm rather than the exception and most
cyber capabilities and operations are unthinkable without a healthy dose
of deception.18 When it discusses attacks from adversaries, US military
cyber doctrine frets the “design of the Internet lends itself to anonymity
and . . . attribution will continue to be a challenge for the foreseeable
future.”19 Of course, this difficulty of attribution is beneficial when the
United States military is looking for a “low probability of detection” for
its own offense and espionage.20
In a phrase very similar to those used by cyber commanders,
the Army’s latest FM 3-24 offers a clear assessment, “Effective
counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored,
predictive, accurate, and reliable intelligence. . . . Without accurate and
predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act.”21
A key goal of intelligence is to take away the insurgent’s ability to hide,
15. Michael Senft, “Lessons Not Learned: Why Our Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Experiences
Should Inform Our Cybersecurity Strategy,” Modern War Institute, February 28, 2019, https://
mwi.usma.edu/lessons-not-learned-post-9-11-counterterrorism-experiences-inform-cybersecuritystrategy/.
16. David Raymond, “Paradoxes of (Cyber) Counterinsurgency,” Cyber Defense Review,
February 9, 2015, https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View
/Article/1136129/paradoxes-of-cyber-counterinsurgency/.
17. John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24,
Counterinsurgency,” in The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Headquarters,
Department of the Army (HQDA) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
18. Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, “Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and
Deception in Cyberspace,” Security Studies 24, no. 2 (2015): 316–48, https://deterrence.ucsd.edu/_
files/Weaving%20Tangled%20Webs_%20Offense%20Defense%20and%20Deception%20in
%20Cyberspace.pdf.
19. JCS, Cyberspace Operations, Joint Publication 3-12, (Washington, DC: JCS, June 8, 2018), I-12.
20. JCS, Cyberspace Operations, IV-8.
21. HQDA, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Field Manual (FM) 3-24 (Washington, DC:
HQDA, 2014), I-19.
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whether in complex terrain or among the population. This has a clear
application to cyber conflict in which adversaries develop their attack
and command-and-control infrastructure in “gray space” and mix
their attacks and exfiltration of stolen data into legitimate traffic flows.
Moreover, in both cyber and counterinsurgency there may be very thin
lines distinguishing what is an intelligence operation versus a purely
military operation.

Host Nation and Populace
“The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than
us doing it well,” states the original FM 3-24.22 The goal is to work by,
with, and through partners who are closest to the threat and may have
unique capabilities and knowledge of the local culture, geography, and
human terrain.
The same holds true for cyber conflict. The only difference is
the host nation is the collection of key cybersecurity companies like
Symantec, FireEye, and CrowdStrike; network service providers like
AT&T, Verizon, and NTT; and major information technology vendors
like Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco. The private sector not only owns the
vast majority of this critical infrastructure but it is on the front lines
of the battle against nation-state attackers and makes the vast majority
of critical decisions to thwart them. While uneven, the analogy is still
useful. The key counterinsurgency problem is identifying insurgents and
separating them from the population. The host nation is often a deeply
imperfect partner in this task, lacking capabilities and with differing
goals and perspectives than the United States.
By contrast, in cyber the private sector often has superior capabilities.
Few if any major cybersecurity incidents have been solved by government
actions.23 Rather, the major technology and cybersecurity companies
of the private sector—AT&T, Verizon, Symantec, FireEye, and
CrowdStrike—have the agility, subject matter expertise, and ability to
change cyberspace directly to resolve incidents decisively, usually while
the government is still arguing about what should be done and which
agency has the right authority. The New York Cyber Task Force found
private sector actions like automatic vulnerability updates and patching,
end-to-end encryption, and cloud-based security have been the most
effective at shaping the terrain of cyberspace in favor of defenders and
reducing sanctuaries at scale.24
These companies are digital natives—their entire organizations are
built around the mission of creating and shaping cyberspace. The cyber
offense and intelligence organizations of the US government would face
significant organizational, budget, authority, and mindset challenges
22. HQDA, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2006), I-27–I-28.
23. Jason Healey, ed., A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012 (Vienna, VA: CCSA,
2013).
24. New York Cyber Task Force, Building a Defensible Cyberspace (New York: Columbia University
School of International and Public Affairs, September 2017), https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites
/default/files/3668_SIPA%20Defensible%20Cyberspace-WEB.PDF.
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replicating such strengths and generally only visit cyber terrain built
and maintained by others.
The private sector can of course be an imperfect partner, conflicted
by its pursuit of profit. But these flaws are no more severe than the
government’s own internal and interagency conflicts. Trade and
diplomatic priorities have often trumped those of cybersecurity as has
pursuing national interests through offensive cyber capabilities for the
US Intelligence Community, military, and law enforcement.
Governments have their own unique and very powerful strengths:
massive resources of national budgets and workforces, staying power to
remain committed for years to resolve seemingly intractable problems,
and additional authorities and levers of national power, including
intelligence, diplomacy, and the military. Rather than trying to replicate
the strengths of the private sector at great financial cost, the US
government must hitch its advantages to those of the private sector.
Beyond the partnership with the host nation, successful
counterinsurgency also requires a supportive population to recognize
the legitimacy of the host nation and US forces. Cyber conflict may be
like counterinsurgency in this way: if you lose moral legitimacy, you lose
the war. If so, the US government needs to win the hearts and minds of
the global population of netizens.
Cyber actors of all kinds—from criminals up to apex predators like
the United States, Russia, and China—hide their infrastructure in “gray
space,” which the military describes as “those portions of cyberspace”
which are neither “protected by the US” nor “owned or controlled by an
adversary or enemy.”25 The use of this polite euphemism obscures the
fact that gray space is mostly private property—devices, computers, and
networks purchased and operated by people and companies around the
world. Treating this private property merely as gray space reduces it to
little more than a square on the chessboard of the never-ending game of
constant contact between adversaries.
Especially after the Snowden revelations about the scale and
intrusiveness of US espionage, the US legitimacy to play this game in the
role of a defender has been challenged.26 One frequent response, which
might be summarized as, “of course US intelligence agencies are going
to spy; don’t hate the player, hate the game,” might be true but misses
the point that people have a unique and exquisitely personal relationship
with their technology. This is not the Cold War when spy-versus-spy
played out in Geneva or Moscow. Gray space holds our deepest secrets
and connects us to beloved family members and intimate friends.
It may be true that spies are going to spy, other intelligence agencies
operate with fewer restrictions, or Americans reveal far more intimate
secrets—with less protection—to tech companies. It also may not
25. JCS, Cyberspace Operations, I-4–I-5.
26. Lawfare, “Snowden Revelations,” Lawfare (blog), n.d., https://www.lawfareblog.com
/snowden-revelations.
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matter. Retired Air Force General and former director of both the
National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency Michael
Hayden warned even entirely legal cyber operations conducted with
proper oversight can suffer a lack of perceived legitimacy. After the
Snowden revelations, many Americans said: “‘You know, I’m not so sure
that constitutes consent of the governed anymore. That may actually be
consent of the governors. You may have told them but you didn’t tell
me.’”27 The same dynamics led to citizens of Allied nations pressuring
their governments to reduce security cooperation with the United States,
which seemed to have no respect for their privacy.28

Firepower
Many of the paradoxes of counterinsurgency deal with firepower and
the use of force. “Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective
it is. . . . military actions by themselves cannot achieve success. . . . The
more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and
the more risk must be accepted.”29
Until recently, the United States has been similarly hesitant to use
cyber capabilities. Successive administrations have been concerned
attacks might cascade or cause unknowable collateral damage, adversaries
might concentrate attacks against vulnerable US cyber-connected
infrastructure, or attacks would work against the preferred US goals
for “an open, interoperable, secure and reliable cyberspace.”30 US cyber
forces were only given relatively free rein against the Islamic State, so
long as cyber actions did not take place outside “the declared areas of
active hostilities” in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.31
No longer. In 2018, then National Security Adviser John Bolton
boasted the restraints on cyber response had been lifted: “Our hands
are not tied as they were in the Obama administration.”32 The new cyber
strategy gave US Cyber Command more leeway to “pursue attackers
across networks and systems,” “continuously engaging and contesting

27. Michael Hayden, interview by Glenn Thrush, “Politico’s Glenn Thrush Interviews
Michael Hayden,” Politico, March 28, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/03
/full-transcript-politicos-glenn-thrush-interviews-michael-hayden-221275.
28. Natasha Lomas, “Europe’s Top Court Strikes Down ‘Safe Harbor’ Data-Transfer
Agreement with U.S.,” TechCrunch, October 6, 2015, https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/06
/europes-top-court-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-agreement-with-u-s/.
29. HQDA, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, I-26–I-28.
30. Barack Obama, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a
Networked World (Washington, DC: White House, May 2011), 3, https://obamawhitehouse.archives
.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf.
31. Dina Temple-Raston, “How the US Hacked ISIS,” National Public Radio, September
26, 2019; and United States Cyber Command: Hearing before the United States Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 115th Cong. (May 9, 2017), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov
/hearings/17-05-09-united-states-cyber-command.
32. John Bolton, “National Security Adviser John Bolton on Cyber Strategy
(Audio
Only),”
September
20,
2018,
https://www.c-span.org/video/?451807-1
/national-security-adviser-bolton-briefs-cyber-strategy-audio-only.
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adversaries” and to “degrade the infrastructure . . . that enable[s] our
adversaries to fight in cyberspace.”33
A direct implied relationship exists between the military’s aggressive
use of cyber force and defeating—or at least disrupting or dissuading—
adversaries.34 But just because this makes traditional military sense does
not mean it will work. As with counterinsurgency, there may be an
inverse relationship between firepower and outcomes. Civilians cannot
evacuate the front lines of cyberspace; the Internet is an infrastructure
built around commercial and cultural needs. The caution displayed by
past US administrations in employing offensive cyber operations may
not have been intended to create mere bureaucratic hassle but may have
been a legitimate procedural step to prevent escalation, miscalculation,
and mistakes.
There are at least three clear reasons to keep cyber rules of
engagement tight. First, the negative impact on legitimacy resulting
from only one or two errant shots in an area crowded with civilians—
and fragile critical infrastructure—can outweigh the dozens, hundreds,
or thousands that hit true, as the United States learned after accidentally
bombing Afghan weddings.35 Second, US adversaries might benefit
from the relative low cost of developing capabilities, easily keeping pace
with the United States and leading to escalation. Third, if adversaries in
cyberspace believe they are retaliating against a strike initiated by the
United States, they are more likely to attack US military operations. And
if DoD networks are too well defended, adversaries will simply target
the private sector. This is not mere conjecture—after the US-Israeli
Stuxnet attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment program, the Iranians did
not retaliate against the Mossad, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the
US military, but instead attacked American banks.36

Recommendations

Some risks resulting from a forward defense posture with fewer
operational restrictions are worth taking in cyber conflicts in order to
achieve gains. Several recommendations follow that will help manage
these risks.
First, the US government must treat the “host nation”—the major
IT and cybersecurity companies—as the supported command, rather
than insisting the military has some unique “secret sauce”—in the

33. Mark Pomerleau, “New Authorities Mean Lots of New Missions at Cyber Command,”
Fifth Domain, May 8, 2019, https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2019/05/08/new
-authorities-mean-lots-of-new-missions-at-cyber-command/; USCYBERCOM, Achieve and Maintain
Cyberspace Superiority: Command Vision for US Cyber Command (Fort Meade, MD: USCYBERCOM,
2018), 6; Jason Healey, “Triggering the New Forever War, in Cyberspace,” Cipher Brief, April 1,
2018; and Nakasone, “Cyber Force,” 11.
34. Jason Healey, “The Implications of Persistent (and Permanent) Engagement in
Cyberspace,” Journal of Cybersecurity 5, no. 1 (2019): 5, https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity
/article/5/1/tyz008/5554878.
35. BBC South Asia, “US ‘Killed 47 Afghan Civilians,’” BBC News, July 11, 2008, http://news
.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7501538.stm.
36. Ellen Nakashima, “Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks on U.S. Banks and Companies,” Washington
Post, September 21, 2012.
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words of an early commander of US Cyber Command—enabling it to
be the center of American cyber defenses.37 This support must go far
beyond bland public-private partnerships—often more subordination
than alliance—or defense support to civil authorities. In the defense
support to civil authorities model, “the military’s cyber capabilities will
be available to civilian leaders to help protect the networks that support
government operations and critical infrastructure,” just as “during a
natural disaster, like a hurricane, military troops and helicopters are
often used by [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] to help
deliver relief.”38
Responding to major cyber incidents is not akin to delivering relief,
it is active contention with an agile adversary working predominantly in
private-sector networks. Accordingly it demands a new model. Erik Korn
and I recently described one possibility, “defense support to the private
sector,” through which critical infrastructure sectors on the front lines
make direct calls for fire from the private sector, task the Intelligence
Community with requirements, coordinate multi-stakeholder defensive
actions, and rely on direct support by new military formations tailored
to each critical infrastructure sector.39
Second, the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community
need to focus more on winning the support of domestic and foreign
audiences—not just other governments and elites, but netizens as well. It
is no longer enough, if it ever was, to defend US operations by saying our
adversaries show even less restraint, all is fair in intelligence collection, or
the issue is leaks about US operations and not the operations themselves.
If the lessons of irregular warfare hold, then the United States must be
accepted as a legitimate defender of cyberspace, a task hard to accomplish
merely through the more aggressive or sustained use of offensive and
intelligence cyber operations.
Third, the Department of Defense needs to be cautious in its
enthusiasm regarding the role of firepower in case disrupting adversaries
just emboldens enemies and alienates friends. Defending forward
must be treated as an operational experiment, not settled wisdom: try
something, measure what works, abandon what does not, repeat.
Fourth, the National Security Council should moderate the
authorities granted to US Cyber Command with a sunset clause and
require specific metrics for success and failure: How long will success

37. Shane Harris, @War: The Rise of the Military-Internet Complex (New York: Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2014), 158.
38. William J. Lynn III, “Remarks on Cyber at the RSA Conference,” (speech, RSA
Conference, San Francisco, CA, February 15, 2011), https://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech
.aspx?speechid=1535.
39. Jason Healey and Erik B. Korn, “Defense Support to the Private Sector: New Concepts for
the DoD’s National Cyber Defense Mission,” Cyber Defense Review, special edition (2019): 227–42,
https://cyberdefensereview.army.mil/CDR-Content/Articles/Article-View/Article/2035015
/defense-support-to-the-private-sector-new-concepts-for-the-dods-national-cyber/.
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take, and how will we know it when we see it?40 If these key questions
cannot be answered, then authorities which enable defending forward
must be scaled back lest the United States create another open-ended
forever war, this time in cyberspace and with nuclear-armed adversaries.
It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, a never-ending string of
generals will testify, as they did for Iraq and Afghanistan, that we are
“turning the corner” in cyberspace, and just one more military push
will lead to success. Before the new strategy becomes too entrenched,
these leaders should pause to remember counterinsurgency doctrine
that reminds us, “sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction,” as it
can be easy to overreact.41 There may simply be no military solution to
countering adversary cyberattacks against the United States.

40. Jason Healey, “Memo to POTUS: Responding to Cyber Attacks and PPD20,” The Cipher Brief, May 24, 2018, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article
/memo-potus-responding-cyber-attacks-ppd-20.
41. HQDA, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, I-27.

